1. Drivers Inside Out Networks Wireless
2. Drivers Inside Out Networks Network
3. Drivers Inside Out Networks Llc
4. Drivers Inside Out Networks Inc
5. Inside Out Networks Usb Peripheral Drivers For Windows Nt4

Digi Inside Out Networks Edgeport 416 DB9 USB Multi-port Converter USB Hub. Simply plug in the Edgeport and in minutes gain up to 16 serial ports to connect bar-code scanners, printers, or any serial peripheral device. Edegport assumes all responsibility for this listing. Watch list is full. Inside Out Networks™ Edgeport Serial Port Free Driver Download An out-of-the-box external alternative to PCI cards, Edgeport makes it easy to add serial, USB or parallel ports inside out networks edgeport 1 a PC, server or thin client in minutes — without opening the chassis, reconfiguring or rebooting the system. Drivers carry significant exposure to a phishing attack by mixing work and personal computing on a smartphone or tablet while also accessing a fleet’s email platform, loadboards and other networks.

Drivers carry significant exposure to a phishing attack, by mixing work and personal computing on a smartphone or tablet while also accessing a fleet’s email or loadboards.Shutterstock image

Ever had one of those Snickers “Wanna get away?” moments?

Wade Anderson, Chief Information Officer for Eagan, Minnesota-based multi-modal hauler Bay and Bay Transportation did. And it was only his fourth day on the job.

July 12, 2018, is a day Anderson is unlikely to forget. It was that afternoon that an offshoot of the infamous SamSam ransomware ransacked the company’s entire IT infrastructure, encrypting all essential files across the carrier’s 80 servers, and the hacker was demanding Bitcoin to release them.

“I had a 30-, 60- and 90-day plan for what I wanted to do, and a security review was in the 30-day plan,” Anderson said, “not the third day plan.”

Anderson and his team were able to cobble together a plan. Bay and Bay’s cloud-based logistics systems were not impacted. They were able to restore some files and emails from backups and were working toward bringing the transportation management system back online when it all came to a grinding halt.

“I had a 30-, 60- and 90-day plan for what I wanted to do and a security review was in the 30-day plan, not the third day plan.” —Wade Anderson, Chief Information Officer, Bay and Bay Transportation

“[The hacker] came back into the network and saw that we were working on restoration,” Anderson said, noting the attacker stopped the restoration process before deleting the backups, undoing about five hours of recovery work in mere seconds.

Exhausted and out of options, Bay and Bay paid the ransom in exchange for the decryption keys. The team – which now included various security experts, acquittances of Anderson’s, third party providers, Bay and Bay's insurance company and the FBI – spent the next 36 hours bringing 95% of the systems and data back online.

“Decrypting takes a lot more time than encrypting,” he joked.

Following the three-day ordeal, Anderson said the only data lost were recent emails and two old servers. The company later discovered that none of its data ever left its network. The hacker held the information hostage but never did anything with it, and customer information was never exposed.

The FBI found the culprits were two groups of cyber criminals that teamed up to install and execute the breach about 12 hours before unleashing it, exploiting an open firewall port.

The hackers were eventually identified and indicted but there was little satisfaction in that for Anderson and his team. Two Iranian citizens were charged in the case but extradition from Iran to the U.S. is nearly impossible, making it unlikely the attackers will ever be held accountable.

A high percentage of malware, ransomware and other types of cyberattacks against businesses – including motor carriers – stems from someone inside the organization clicking a link they shouldn’t have, without any intention of potentially crippling a company’s ability to perform daily operations.

While ultimately not the culprit in the Bay and Bay attack, Anderson and his team initially thought the company was the victim of a phishing email campaign on an unsuspecting employee.

“For the first several hours we thought it was a user entry; that someone clicked a phishing link in an email,” he said. “It sounded plausible.”

A high percentage of malware, ransomware and other types of cyberattacks against businesses, including motor carriers, stem from someone inside the organization clicking a link they shouldn’t have.Shutterstock imageDrivers, training and cyber security
During the interview process for its Best Fleets to Drive For, CarriersEdge Co-Founder Jane Jazrawy said the company asked carriers about their cybersecurity efforts at the request of the one company’s insurance partners. More than 75% of respondents to the survey said they had systems in place to protect against a cyber attack and offered some degree of training to employees, but rarely was that training extended to the company’s drivers.

“Many of [the carriers] told us that they didn’t provide anything for drivers – no training, no extra security measures at all,” she said. “Some fleets told us that because drivers use tablets, it’s not necessary because tablets have built-in protection. Fleets said they tend to focus on office staff when they put in additional protections or provide training. In their view, drivers aren’t a risk because don’t have corporate email addresses or access to internal networks.”

In reality, drivers carry significant exposure to a phishing attack by mixing work and personal computing on smartphones or tablets, while also accessing email, loadboards and other internal networks.

“From their cab … they’re into your firewall, and they’re accessing external websites on their device,” said Chris Wolfe, CEO of asset tracking provider PowerFleet. “Educating your employees – that’s No. 1. You need to educate them about phishing attacks and tell them not to download things from the Internet, especially on company computers.”

Jazrawy agreed, adding that all the devices drivers use provide a potential portal directly into a carrier's IT systems.

'Drivers use free email systems, browsing websites and social networks that hackers frequently target,” she said. “Drivers may unknowingly be passing viruses to the office staff through text or email, so it would make sense to at least include them in training. It’s a gap waiting to be exploited.”

'Drivers may unknowingly be passing viruses to the office staff through text or email, so it would make sense to at least include them in training.' —CarriersEdge Co-Founder Jane Jazrawy

The brief assumption that a clicked email link was the root of Bay and Bay’s problem is what allowed the hacker to return to the system once restoration was underway, as the original firewall access point was still open.

“We were just so focused on getting everything back up and running,” Anderson said, “but the first thing you should do is always check the perimeter. Set up your blocking and tackling from your firewall – at your perimeter.”

Since drivers are on the road, their perimeter can look different than office staff. Kevin Linardic, chief technology officer for LTL and final mile TMS provider Carrier Logistics, noted that drivers who connect to public WiFi should always do so via virtual private network (VPN), which enables users to send and receive encrypted data across shared or public networks.

Leonard’s Express, a 500-truck fleet based in Farmington, New York, experienced a phishing attack in June 2017 after one of its employees clicked a phishing link in an email.

“When a user initiates something, they’re already in,” said Chris DeMillo, the company’s head of information systems. “You’ve got this protection suite…once a pinhole is exposed and open into your environment, it just floods,” he said. “I was amazed at how fast [malware] can run rampant across your network. It was mind blowing and scary.”

The fleet was able to fight off the attack after three days, with little impact on its operations and finances, but the company was “on pen and paper” during that time, said DeMillo.

Drivers Inside Out Networks Wireless

Though there are always steps fleets can take to bolster their IT infrastructure to better protect themselves, much of cybersecurity protection starts with educating your workforce. And that’s the biggest area that Leonard’s concentrated on in the wake of its exposure. “Education, education, education, training – and then re-education,” said Mike Riccio, the company’s chief marketing officer.

As the industry has grown more complex and digitally connected, “there are so many entry points,” said Riccio, in the modern environment for hackers to break into a fleet’s network. “It requires constant vigilance,” he said. “You have to continue to educate your employees.”

“We thought we had sufficient protection,” said DeMillo. “We learned a lot of hard lessons, but good, valuable lessons. We realized the importance of investment.”

Drivers Inside Out Networks Network

• 6Configuration of NDIS drivers

Overview

Drivers based on the 'Network Driver Interface Specification' (NDIS) are the default in the Windows world. The most recent version is NDIS 6 which is used in Windows Vista. Windows 98 used NDIS 5, Windows 95 came with NDIS 3.1. In DOS you have to use the real-mode driver NDIS2.

Where to find them

It is most likely a NDIS driver exists for your network card. Look for a directory called 'NDIS2' in your cards installation files. If you can't find a driver, take a look at this site. The ending of the driver name has to be *.DOS, so for instance the driver of the 3com 3C574 PC-Card is called 'EL3C574.DOS'.

How they work

In the language of the NDIS architecture these drivers are called 'Media Access Control' (MAC) drivers.

The MAC driver is only one component of the NDIS architecture as you can see in the figure above. According to the NDIS 2.1 documentation NDIS seems to work like that:

• Commands in FDCONFIG.SYS (FreeDOS) or CONFIG.SYS (other DOS) load the Protocol Manager driver PROTMAN.DOS, the MAC driver and the protocol driver. This can be done by lines for each of these drivers or by starting the 'Installable File System Helper' driver, which is loaded by 'DEVICEHIGH=IFSHLP.SYS' and starts the Protocol Manager, the MAC and the protocol drivers according to PROTOCOL.INI.
• The Protocol Manager reads the configuration from PROTOCOL.INI and makes them available to the MAC driver and protocol driver which load after him.
• The MAC driver and the protocol driver load and configure themselve according to that information. They identify themselves to the Protocol Manager.
• Before MAC driver and protocol driver can communicate, they have to be bound together, so they can access each others 'entry points' (communication ports). This bind process is controlled by the Protocol Manager based on information in PROTOCOL.INI.
• The binding sequence can be triggered by NET.EXE or NETBIND.COM (which can be done in AUTOEXEC.BAT).
• The Protocol Manager (PROTMAN.DOS) then starts the memory resident (Terminate and Stay Resident - TSR) program PROTMAN.EXE to execute the bind command and to control the correct ordering of drivers.
• After binding has occurred, the MAC and the protocol driver communicate directly to each other. The Protocol Manager is not involved in this communication process any longer, so NETBIND.COM frees most of the memory previously reserved by the Protocol Manager.

The configuration of NDIS under DOS has changed over time with different versions of the package. Some hints about the differences can be found here. In this document, I am assuming that we use the NDIS files shipped with MS Client 3.0.

As this section is all about getting packet driver based TCP/IP applications up and running with DOS we will not go into details about MS Client here , this is already explained elsewhere.

Additional files needed

So how can we use the NDIS2 (MAC) driver that came with our network interface card for TCP/IP networking? As we have learned from the description above, we need some more files. These are:

• The Protocol Manager ('PROTMAN.DOS' and 'PROTMAN.EXE')
• The bind utility ('NETBIND.COM')

These files are part of the MS Client 3.0 which can be downloaded here:

ftp://ftp.microsoft.com/bussys/Clients/MSCLIENT/DSK3-1.EXE
ftp://ftp.microsoft.com/bussys/Clients/MSCLIENT/DSK3-2.EXE

The three files mentioned are part of 'DSK3-1.EXE'. Use the utility 'EXPAND.EXE' included on the first disk to uncompress these files.

• Copy DSK3-1.EXE to a directory like C:MSCLIENT1. Avoid a long path if you do this in Windows. 16-bit software won't execute, if the path is too long.
• Run DSK3-1.EXE to unpack its content.
• Decompress PROTMAN.DO_ and PROTMAN.EX_.

• NETBIND.COM is already uncompressed. Now you can take and use the three files.

Read the LICENSE.TXT file before you start using the files. The software is free for internal use. Neither the distribution nor a modification is allowed.

The converter / shim

The last piece we need is the 'NDIS to Packet Driver Converter'. Get the widely used 'DIS_PKT9.DOS' (version 9) or alternatively the newer (version 11) 'DIS_PKT.DOS'. There are no differences in usage and handling. DIS_PKT.DOS is part of FreeDOS 1.0. If you installed the network apps from the FullCD distribution, it can be located in C:FDOSBIN.

Both shims were written by Prof. Joe R. Doupnik (Utah State University) and Dan Lanciani (Harvard University). The copyright holds the now historic FTP Software, Inc., which released this driver as public domain, free for use, distribution, change and with sourcecode.

Configuration of NDIS drivers

As I already mentioned, this is just a minimal installation of the MS Client 3.0. The only purpose is to use packet-driver-based TCP/IP applications. For this purpose:

Copy the four files

into a directory, for instance C:NET.

Copy also the MAC driver of your network interface card, for instance:

into this directory.

Now we have to create the configuration file needed for the NDIS architecture: Create a file with the name PROTOCOL.INI inside the C:NET directory. For our minimal configuration it just needs the following lines:

Explanation of the parameters

Like other *.ini files, PROTOCOL.INI is structured into section names in square brackets and item names with values assigned to them.

The first section [protman] defines the Protocol Manager. Like described above, the Protocol Manager is loaded as driver PROTMAN.DOS which is called 'PROTMAN$' here. Section and line are mandatory.

The section [EL3C574] defines the network interface card. By default the section itself is named after the card - this is useful, if you have more than one network card and use different sections for different cards.

So the section name is the first value to change here. It would be a good idea to name it after your own network card. But you may as well rename the section to 'netcard', 'NIC' or even 'baked_beans' - whatever you like, as long as you also change all the other lines in PROTOCOL.INI that point to that section.

The next line of this section is 'DriverName=EL3C574$'. It defines the driver for the network interface card. In our example this is EL3C574.DOS, which is called 'EL3C574$' here. Most certainly you will use a different NIC than the one mentioned in the example. So you will have to change this line. You find the correct name of the driver in a text-file called 'PROTOCOL.INI' that should be part of the NDIS driver files supplied with your card.

It is also possible to add more lines to this section, so you can define special settings for your network card. Consult the 'PROTOCOL.INI' supplied with your NDIS driver for more information. But in many cases the line with the drivername should be enough.

The next section '[PKTDRV]' defines our NDIS to Packet Driver Converter, which is 'DIS_PKT.DOS' or 'DIS_PKT9.DOS'. Both are called by the name 'PKTDRV$'.

It is important that the converter will bind to the driver of the network card. This is done by the next line 'bindings=EL3C574'. Please note that this name includes no '$' letter - it refers to the name of the section that defines the driver, not to the driver itself. So if you had called this section '[baked_beans]' as suggested above, you'd have to write 'bindings=baked_beans' here ;-).

The item 'intvec' specifies the software interrupt vector used by the packet driver interface. As already explained, this should be the hexadecimal value 0x60 per default.

The 'chainvec' item also defines an available software interrupt. Its function is still a mystery to me. According to packet driver inventor FTP, adding a chain vector interrupt may improve packet processing speed and reliability. Users saw 'a 10-fold increase in performance'. To avoid EMM386 errors, some recommend to set an interrupt that increases the vector by decimal 8. So if the intvec is 0x60 (that is decimal 96), then the chainvec should be decimal 104 (96 + 8) which is hexadecimal 0x68. This is also described by one of the authors of DIS_PKT.DOS, Dan Lanciani. Please write if you find out more.

These are all settings in PROTOCOL.INI needed for our purpose. A last hint: If you consider changing some of these values at each boot, for instance by choices presented by a DOS boot menu, you may find Horst Schaeffer's freeware 'Inifile' helpful.

Installation

Drivers Inside Out Networks Llc

The last thing left to do now is to load the drivers at boot. So change your system files to contain the following lines:

The '/I' parameter tells the Protocol Manager the location of PROTOCOL.INI. This is not needed if both are in the same directory.

Drivers Inside Out Networks Inc

You might want to experiment with DEVICEHIGH instead of DEVICE. But this might conflict with the UMBs provided by Extended Memory Managers like EMM386 or JEMMEX.

Note that NETBIND.COM can not be loaded high and should just be executed from AUTOEXEC.BAT. If you try to load it like a driver, it will abort with the message 'run-time error R6009 - not enough space for environment'.

Reboot

Inside Out Networks Usb Peripheral Drivers For Windows Nt4

That's all. Reboot the system and use a simple TCP/IP application like ping to test if everything is working.

ODI driver installation <--- NDIS driver installation ---> Loading the TCP/IP Kernel (Stack)